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Commodification, Coercion and Not Caring
In What Money Can’t Buy, Michael J. Sandel argues that, in recent decades, the extent to
which we have allowed markets to seep into nearly every sphere of society requires limitation.
He prefaces by describing the universally agreed upon standard humans have held markets to,
stating that viewing or treating human beings as means of market transactions is wrong, such as
with slavery and human trafficking (Sandel, 2). This ideal is threatened by our increasingly
market society, which continues to commodify certain aspects of humanity previously void of
marketization. He offers many examples of what should and shouldn’t be subject to market
transaction, one of which is prostitution. Sandel submits two common objections to prostitution
on which he then establishes two potential grounds for limiting market transactions in general. If
the transaction in question corrupts people or larger human values by treating them as
commodities or if the transactions themselves are coerced into existence, it shouldn’t be allowed
(Sandel, 94). I will respond by showing that the scope of these grounds are far broader than
Sandel initiates by comparing them to traditional market transactions. In finding the majority of
market transactions also exhibit the objectionable traits of prostitution, I will then refute Sandel’s
limitation argument by explaining that this is a part of a market society, and Sandel’s scrutiny
over it is in fact limiting the only freedom people do have within this system.
Sandel first offers the common objection about degrading moral worth by analyzing the
legitimacy of prostitution as labor. He does this to establish his reason for evaluating the
limitations we place on our market society based on how it degrades the human condition. In
other words, this objection is that the commodification of sex views both the human body and
the act itself by corrupting society’s overall perception of both (Sandel, 95). But what makes
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the services exchanged during sex work different from that of regular work? During the
former, a worker exchanges their specific skills and time for a wage and executes this labor
with their body. However, this exchange would be equally true for legal forms of labor, such
as that of a fast-food worker: who also uses their specific skills and time by means of their
body or person in exchange for money. The actual work involved in both instances employs
the same factors: one’s body, time, and skills. If using one’s body in executing these skills
means that their body is a commodity as this objection to prostitution suggests, then one must
be consistent in applying this logic to a majority of service jobs. This reveals the true extent to
which Sandel’s concern over the commodification of humans should reach. The concern for
degrading humans through commodification has a wider scope. This conclusion is confirmed
by an example Sandel provides for another point he makes regarding life insurance, but works
well to exemplify how companies already view their employees as commodities. For example,
when Michael Rice, assistant manager at Walmart, passed away from a heart attack that he
experienced on the job, his employing company collected a $300,000 life insurance policy
(Sandel, 131). When confronted with a federal lawsuit from his wife, who herself received no
benefits, a Walmart spokesperson responded that the company held these life insurance
policies on the majority of its employees. He further explained that Walmart deserved
compensation for the cost of training and replacing them (Sandel, 132). Although all
companies may not go as far as Walmart, this example illustrates a very real view of the
exchange of labor for wage not being different from the exchange of material items for
money. This highlights how humans are being viewed as material items for monetary
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exchange, similar to how they are viewed under systems of slavery, in market transactions far
exceeding prostitution.
Although the monetary exchange of prostitution may resemble that of most labor, Sandel
offers a second objection to it as a market transaction. He alleges that unlike most market
exchanges, prostitution is coerced by circumstance. Sandel characterizes coercion as one filling a
job out of desperate necessity rather than free choice as a free market would theoretically dictate.
The reasons he gives for why someone would perform sex work are “poverty, drug addiction, or
other unfortunate life circumstances,” strongly connecting these circumstances to one not having
an alternative (Sandel, 95). This conception of coercion considers one’s motive for involvement
in a market exchange, calling into question what makes these reasons different from that of those
who are traditionally employed. In a society that works for the weekend, the reason many people
are at their current job is to make money. If they do not make money, they may not survive in a
system they were all born into, so how much free choice is really involved in the free market?
What people are taught to do in order to survive, working for a paycheck, correlates with
Sandel’s definition of coercion. Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes addressed this issue with his
dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court case Lochner v. New York. Holmes challenged the
Court’s ruling that since bakers chose their job, anything they must endure during their
employment is justified, no matter how unfavorable. Holmes questioned if bakers are given a
choice between being employed at a bakery or dying of starvation, is it really a free choice?
(Holmes, 1). This exemplifies how most jobs people assume within a market society are out of
necessity for their own survival and thus, according to Sandel, their choice in doing so was
coerced. Most of the time, we do not have the choice to go through life and not participate in
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markets; it is how we pay for our food, healthcare, education, and livelihood. If we argue that
any job viewed as a means to an end rather than the end itself is coercive, then the opposite
would be true for jobs that one must work towards, usually through years of education such as
being a doctor, lawyer, teacher, professor, where the goal isn’t just money but the work itself. But
the fact remains that many individuals see their employment for the money it affords, which
makes this choice just as coerced as that of any sex worker. Thus, we can distinguish this kind of
market exchange on the grounds that it is coerced, just as with prostitution.
In proving the parallels between prostitution and legal, traditional forms of employment,
we have found the objections to these market transactions are applicable to the majority of that
already existing within our market society. However, because Sandel is more right than he knew
to write about the scope of his concerns over commodification and coercion, he is wrong to limit
what money can or can’t buy on their behalf. Sandel’s concern over a seemingly dangerous trend
where more and more things are subject to market transaction, is invalidated by the sheer fact
that we are already living in it for as long as we have had market systems. Whatever intrinsic or
societal damage Sandel considers a consequence of allowing people to sell their bodies has not
just already been done but remains an active ingredient in the foundations of a market society.
Coercion and commodification are characteristics as integral to market systems as the markets
themselves. This is because the majority of jobs fundamental to our economy, such as service
jobs, entail these common moral objections to prostitution, yet aren’t percieved this way. It may
seem far-fetched to overcome any moral dilemma and accept these objectionable factors as a part
of market transactions. Yet, we have long accepted them without realizing as proven by the
perpetual presence of market systems in our society despite constant critiques such as these. If
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we continue to consider acting on concerns like Sandel’s without reforming the entirety of
market systems themselves, we will also continue corrections that are not only entirely pointless
but incredibly harmful. Sandel tries to free us from the consequences of an increasingly market
society by limiting it only to undermine the little freedom we have in a system we did not have
the freedom to choose. I argue this is the freedom afforded by making money. Especially in the
increasingly market society Sandel describes as the basis for his concerns, where money matters
more and more, so does our ability to make it, and thus effectively participate in a society where
most everything is up for sale. Therefore, limiting any potential market transaction as Sandel
poses is also limiting people’s already limited ability to exist more freely within this society.
Sandel laid out arguments for why we should limit certain entities from being subject to
market transactions, with respect to his concerns over how the status quo’s view of human beings
could be altered. My line of reasoning in response is as follows; if prostitution can be objected to
on the basis of both corruption through commodification and coercion, than most jobs that most
people must assume at some point in their lives can be as well. Considering these jobs have
always comprised the majority of that available in a market society, we can allow all potential
employment opportunities regardless of these objections. Therefore, we can now afford people
far more freedom within the context of a market society than Sandel’s proposed limitations
would have. I am not arguing whether or not market systems are right for doing what Sandel
objects too, but rather, that we shouldn’t care in the first place. We need to realize that if we want
to respect morals in the manner Sandel suggests, more fundamental aspects of the system need to
be addressed, but barring radical reform to the status quo, we have an established system that
inherently views people in this way and will continue to do so,
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